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NOTES

FINANCE RATES IN CONSUMER INSTALMENT CREDIT SALES:
THE TIME-PRICE DOCTRINE IN MONTANA
R. Keith Strong
INTRODUCTION
Although Montana's usury statute provides that parties shall agree
to no more than ten per cent per year,' the purchaser of consumer goods
in this state may find himself paying a finance charge of up to nineteen
per cent of the cash price of the goods annually for the privilege of
buying in instalments. 2 The legal theory exempting finance charges
on sales from regulation by the usury statute is known as the timeprice doctrine. The doctrine originated in the courts but Montana's supreme court has yet to face it. A glance at the advertisements in any
newspaper offering easy financing for credit sales reveals the profound
influence of the time-price doctrine on this state's economy.
In the nation as a whole the past two decades have witnessed an
erosion of the doctrine's status as sole regulator of finance rates in
consumer credit sales. New cases have limited the doctrine; new
legislation has abolished it. The flurry of developments encourages an
investigation of the relevancy of the time-price doctrine to consumer
credit sales in this state. This note will sketch the history and characteristics of the time-price doctrine, examine its current status in the
nation and in Montana, and briefly look at an alternative solution to
the problem of regulating consumer credit sale finance rates.
THE TIME-PRICE DOCTRINE AT WORK
Consumer instalment credit plays a significant 3 and rapidly expanding 4 role in the national economy. The significance of instalment
credit is largely due to the prevalance of instalment sale credit.5 An
illustration of the application of the time-price doctrine will show how
it encourages the extension of consumer sale credit.
'REvIsED

CODES OF MONTANA

§§ 47-125, 47-126 (1947)

[hereinafter cited as R.C.M.

1947].
.R.C.M. 1947, & 74-608(1). A major source of confusion before the enactment of the
Truth-In-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1968) was that finance rates might be stated
in several different manners: as a total dollar sum, as a percentage, or as a number
of dollars per hundred dollars per year. The Truth-In-Lending Act provides a formula
for conversion of all these methods into one standard percentage rate. A statement of
the formula is found at 34 Fed. Beg. 2017 (1969). Applying this formula to the eleven
dollars per 100 dollars per year allowable rate found in R.C.M. 1947, § 74-608 yields
a rate of 19 per cent.
8
At the end of June, 1972, $114,567,000,000 in consumer installment credit (excluding
real estate mortgages) was outstanding in the United States. Of this total, $9,791,000,000 was advanced in June alone. 58 FEDERAL RESERvE BOARI BULLETIN, AO.8
pp. A56, A58 (Aug. 1972).
'The 1972 figure compares with the $4,503,000,000 outstanding at the end of 1939. Id.
5p. A56.
Some indication of the amount of sale credit is given from the fact that in June, 1972,
automobile paper outstanding alone was worth $41,104,000,000. Id. p. A56.
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The person who intends to buy consumer goods but who either
cannot or does not want to pay with funds he already has, faces two
choices. He may borrow from an institutional lender and pay the cash
price with the proceeds of the loan. He must then repay the advance
with interest. The other alternative is to finance the goods through the
seller. The buyer who chooses this course will sign a contract with the
seller obligating himself to pay, usually in instalments, the cash price
of the goods as well as a charge for the privilege of paying over time.
The importance of the time-price doctrine is due to the different
way courts have chosen to treat these two means of accomplishing the
same end. If the buyer chooses the first course, courts hold, except
where small loan laws apply, that the usury statute regulates the amount
of interest the lender may charge for his loan.6 The second option is
the typical time-price sale.7 The majority of courts hold that in a
time-price sale the usury statute does not apply to regulate the finance
charge,8 thus the charge may greatly exceed the rate of return permissible under the usuary statute.' Most courts cling to this position
when the seller does not collect the finance charge but instead sells
the contract to a finance agency at a discount equal to the amount of
the finance charge.' 0 Some courts even apply the exemption, the timeprice doctrine, when the consent of a finance agency to accept the
buyer as a credit risk is a condition of the sale and the seller extends
no credit at all."
Several justifications are commonly given for the courts' persistent
exemption of time-price sales from the limits of the usury laws. Chief
among them is the assertion that the transaction is neither a loan nor
a forbearance of an existing debt,' 2 so that the generally accepted
definition of usury does not apply.'3 Some courts still quote the old
adage that, although he may borrow from necessity, a person buys
from choice and can simply refuse to buy if he does not like the price
of the credit.' 4 It is sometimes argued that the doctrine merely reflects
4

R.C.M. 1947, §§ 47-125, 47-126. On loans of $1000 or less the provisions of the Montana
Consumer Loan Act, R.C.M. 1947, § 47-205 allow licensed lenders to charge higher rates.
'For a more detailed description of the retail instalment sale see: B. CURRAN, TRENDS
IN CONSUMER CREDIT, 91 (1965); Warren, Regulation of Finance Charges in Retail
Instalment Sales, 68 YALE L.J. 839, 845, (1959).
'See the list of cases cited in Dennis v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 223 Tenn. 415, 446
S.W. 2d 260, 263 (1960) ; See, cases annotated at 14 A.L.R. 3d 1065, 1077-1082 (1967).
'Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation of America, 17 Utah 2d 114, 405 P.2d 339 (1965).
"Languille v. Central-Penn National Bank 38 Del. Ch. 566, 156 A.2d 410 (1959).
nAtlas Security Co. v. Copeland, 124 Kan. 393, 260 P. 659 (1927).
"Hogg v. Ruffner, 66 U.S. 115 (1861).
'zThe elements generally held necessary to constitute usury are:
(a) an unlawful intent;
(b) money or its equivalent;
(c) a loan or forbearance;
(d) the understanding that the loan is to be repaid;
(e) the exaction of a higher rate for the use of the money than is allowed by law.
State v. J.C. Penney, 48 Wisc.2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641, 645 (1970).
"Languille v. Central-Penn National Bank of Philadelphia, 38 Del. Ch. 382, 153 A.2d
211, 213 (1959).
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the theory, basic to the free enterprise system, that a seller should be
15
able to charge whatever the market will bear for his goods. Another
influence is the continued need for credit in an expanding economy.' 6
All of these arguments carry some weight. For an understanding of
regulation of finance rates for consumer credit sales, however, as Justice
Holmes said: "A page of history is worth a volume of logic.' 7 A
short look at the history of the time-price doctrine offers a more convincing explanation of the continued existence of the doctrine.
EVOLUTION OF THE DOCTRINE
HISTORY
Beete v. Bidgood,'8 decided in England in 1826, is the earliest case
stating that the difference between the cash price of goods and a higher
price for deferred payment is not interest. The allegedly usurious transaction was a sale of land. The buyer gave the seller promissory notes
aggregating the cash price of the land. The notes had staggered due
dates and bore what the contract for sale called "interest" at a rate
higher than that allowed by the applicable usury statute. The court
saw only one difficulty in the case: the parties had referred to the
charge on the notes as interest. The substance of the contract, according to the court, was a sale of land. The usury statute did not apply to
the cost of paying over time rather than with cash, regardless of what
labels the parties used. The transaction was a sale and not a loan.' 9
The doctrine was brought to the United States soon after, and
became a permanent feature on the landscape of American law in the
United States Supreme Court case, Hogg v. Ruffner.20 There, as well,
a sale of land was attacked as usurious. The Court made this classic
statement of the time-price rationale:
[A] vendor may prefer $100 in hand to double the sum in expectancy,
and a purchaser may prefer the greater price with the longer credit;
. .. such a transaction has none of the characteristics of usury;
it is not for the loan of money or forbearance of a debt.'
In this land sale case, decided 110 years ago, are articulated the same
justifications that are given today: the seller should be able to charge
what the market will bear; and the transaction is neither a loan nor
a forbearance but a sale. Considered in the context of a long-term
contract for sale of land the arguments are persuasive. The bargaining
power of the parties was equal; the buyer was not forced to buy; there
11d.
1
11d. See also, discussion in Uni-Serv Corp. of Massachusetts v. Commissioner of Banks,
349 Mass. 283, 207 N.E.2d 906 (1965) as an example of the reluctance of courts to
overturn the principle because of the need for credit and the reliance on the time-price
form.
"New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
'sBeete v. Bidgood, 108 Eng. Rep. 792 (K.B. 1827).
19Id. at 794.
2llogg v. Ruffner, supra note 12.
1Id. at 118-119.
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was no finance agency involved and so the device could hardly have
appeared to cloak a loan. These arguments were taken out of the
land-sale context, however, and used in consumer credit sales when the
industrial revolution started to flood the market with consumer goods.
Hogg v. Ruffner 22 had been established law for more than half a
century when the credit boom of the early part of the twentieth century
hit the United States. The relatively high cost of such goods as automobiles brought a concomitant demand for credit. 23 Available evidence
indicates that consumer instalment credit is legitimately more expensive
than most usury statutes would allow. 24 When legislatures passed no
laws to regulate the new phenomenon, courts fell back on the timeprice doctrine to fill the gap. 25 The effect of the application of the
time-price doctrine to finance charges, however, was to remove all upper
26
bounds. Rates skyrocketed.
The demand for a reasonable upper limit on the rates collected
as finance charges stirred state legislatures into action. In 1935, states
began enacting legislation designed to correct some of the worst abuses
of the time-price doctrine. 27 These acts, known as retail instalment sales
acts, codify the judicially-created time-price doctrine. They apply to
the typical closed end credit sale, a purchase of one fairly expensive
item resulting in a sale contract for a fixed amount including a set
finance charge to be paid in a set number of instalments.2 These acts
require that the retail instalment sale contracts be in writing and that
they limit the finance charges and place requirements for disclosure
in such contracts. 29 The story of the regulation of consumer credit
sale finance charges is largely told in the adoption and refinement of
these acts. 3 0 Since retail instalment sale acts did not attempt a new
approach to sale finance regulation, states which did not adopt such
acts relied upon the time-price doctrine. Where neither time-price

22Id.
2Britton and Ulrich, The Illinois Retail Instalment Sales Act-Historical Background
and Comparative Legislation, 53 N.W.U.L.R. 137 (1958).
'For detailed studies of the effects of limiting returns on consumer credit transactions
to the 10% allowed by one usury statute see: Lynch, Consumer Credit at Ten Per Cent
Simple: The Arkansas Case, 1968 UNIV. O5 ILL. L.F. 592; Student Article, An Empirical Study of the Arkansas Usury Law: "With Friends Like That ... ", 1968 UNIV. or
ILL. L.F. 544.
2Berger v. Lodge, 90 Cal. App. 19, 265 P. 515 (1928).
'See, Berger, Usury in Instalment Sales, 2 LAw AND CONTEMP. PROB. 148, 153 (1935),
indicating that 86% charges for three month periods were not unheard of.
2'Warren, supra note 7 at 843, describes these early acts.
"For a detailed discussion of the closed end credit sale see Curran, supra note 7,
10-12.
2Britton and Ulrich, supra note 23, treat the provisions in a typical retail instalment
sale act.
For an idea of the evolution of these acts in recent years, see, Warren, supra note 7
generally for a discussion of the situation in 1958. Compare that discussion with the
state of the law in 1966 as portrayed in CURRAS, supra note 7 at 256-278 and as it
currently exists, 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1401 Chart: Retail Instalment Sales.
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doctrine nor retail instalment sale act exist, consumer instalment sale
finance rates are governed by the usury statute.3 1
When finance charge regulation had developed to this extent the
waters were muddied even more by the addition of an entirely new
credit arrangement. Known as open-end or revolving credit and seen
in the bank credit card or retail charge card, the arrangement involves
an agreement between the buyer and the card issuer,' 2 allowing the
buyer to purchase one or many items on credit and to pay at the end
of a set billing period. If the buyer chooses not to pay the entire
balance at the end of the billing period he must, according to the terms
of the credit agreement, pay some stated fraction of the balance each
subsequent billing period along with a finance charge on the outstanding
balance. 3 3 Since this arrangement differs from closed end credit, the
one-item, set-term, contract contemplated by the time-price doctrine and
the retail instalment sale acts, most states have adopted acts specifically
to regulate open-end credit.3 4 Some states rely solely upon the time35
price doctrine.
This, then, is the traditional 6 law regulating finance charges on
consumer credit sales in this country. At the foundation is the usury
statute. Exceptions are made for valid time-price sales. The time-price
doctrine is held in check by retail instalment sale acts; and open-end
credit is controlled by either the time-price doctrine itself, a retail
instalment sale act 3 7 or a special act.3 8 To answer the question of how
closely these laws apply to today's consumer sale credit market it is
necessary to determine in detail how courts decide when a transaction
is a valid time-price sale.
THE TIATE-PRICE DOCTRINE IN THE COURTS

The evolution just described has not been a quiet process; the timeprice doctrine has been the target of frequent litigation. As a result,
although the basic doctrine may be stated simply, it is difficult to find
uniformity in treatment of time-price cases. A review of the elements
of the time-price sale along with some of its most frequent qualifications
will give some idea of the problem.
See, discussion supra
note 24.
"-Not only merchants but also finance agencies issue cards establishing open end credit
accounts. See, Brandel and Leonard, Bank Charge Cards: New Cash or New Credit?,
69 MICH. L.R. 1033 (1971).
1Id. for a more detailed discussion of the arrangement.
"l CCH CoNsuMER CREDIT GUID 2501, Chart: Open End Credit.
"Massachusetts: Uni-Serv Corporation of Massachusetts v. Commissioner of Banks 349
Mass. 283, 207 N.E. 2d 906 (1965); Tennessee: Dennis v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., supra
note 8.
"New legislation has been adopted by seven states which eliminates the multiplicity of
statutes characteristic of most states. See, discussion of the UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT
8Arkansas is the only state relying solely on its usury statute.

CODE, infra.

87Montana is one of few jurisdictions taking this approach. See, discussion of Montana
law infra.
"UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, infra.
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Elements of a valid time-price sale

The essence of the time-price doctrine is the buyer's ability to freely
choose his own course of action after weighing the relative merits to
him of buying with cash or paying a higher price for credit.3 9 Full
knowledge of both the cash and the time prices is necessary to make
the buyer aware of the implications of his choice. A general statement
of the rule is that the finance charge of a credit sale is not interest in
the meaning of the usury statute if the seller, in good faith, discloses to
the buyer both the cash and credit prices of the goods. 40 Courts, however, have not left the doctrine so simple.
B.

Qualifications of the doctrine

Historically courts have tended to closely scrutinize transactions
which might be devices to evade the usury statutes. 41 Alleged time-price
sales are examined in this light. Qualifications of the basic doctrine
have emerged when courts have found overreaching in any detail
of the transaction. For the purposes of this note, cases in which courts
have refused to accept the argument that a particular transaction was
actually a sale rather than a loan may be divided roughly into two
general fact situations. Courts find alleged sales usurious when the
seller fails to disclose both prices. There is also an increasingly high
frequency of refusal to apply the time-price doctrine when too close a
relationship exists between the seller and a finance agency which ultimately buys the consumer's contract.
If the two-price requirement of the time-price doctrine is aimed
at providing the buyer with enough information to make an intelligent
choice between cash and credit buying, incomplete disclosure would
avoid the goal. The majority of courts hold strictly that incomplete
42
disclosure in any material particular makes the transaction usurious.
It follows that a failure to disclose either the time or cash prices is fatal
to a time-price sale 43 as may be a contract signed in blank 44 or the
inclusion of ambiguous 45 or unlabelled charges. 46 The connection of other
cases to the time-price doctrine is more difficult to understand. Some
courts, for example, bold that the necessity of full and good faith disclosure
requires that if the time-price is determined by applying a rate table
to the cash price a loan rather than a sale has taken place.4 7
pLanguille v. Central-Penn National Bank of Philadelphia, supra note 14.
"Warren, supra note 10 at 841.
"For a discussion of the place of the time-price doctrine. in the theory of the general
usury statutes see: Benfield, Money, Mortgage and Migraine-The Usury Headache,
19 CASE W. REs. L.R. 819, 844 (1968); Shanks, Practical Problems in the Application of Archaic Usury Statutes, 53 VA. L.R. 327 (1967).
"Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., 220 Ark. 601, 249 S.W. 2d 973 (1952).
"Id.
"Midland Loan Finance Co. v. Lorentz, 209 Minn. 278, 296 N.W. 911 (1941).
"Hare v. General Contract Purchase Corp., supra note 42.
"Beattv v. Franklin Investment Co., 115 App. D.C. 311, 319 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir. 1963).
"Lloyd v. Gutgsell, 175 Neb. 755, 124 N.W.2d 198 (1963).
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Further qualifications of the doctrine have arisen when some courts
have found a close relationship between the seller and a finance agency
to be indicative of the existence of a loan rather than a sale. 48 For
example, even when the buyer is quoted two prices, some courts find
an agreement usurious when the finance agency must consent to accept
the buyer as a credit risk as a condition of a sale. 49 That the seller has
been furnished contracts and rate tables by a finance agency has been
held to make an agreement usurious.5 0 A recent case holds that whenever a seller makes a credit sale with the reasonable expectation that
the contract will be discounted to a finance agency, the difference
between the time and the cash prices will be held to be interest, and
as such, regulated by the usury statutes. 51
The doctrine has also been criticized in cases of open-end credit.
The reasons are found in the two price disclosure requirements and in
the nature of open-end credit. It is impossible to tell the open-end
credit buyer beforehand exactly how much the total finance charge
will be since the buyer decides whether to pay immediately or to spread
his payments out. Stating that open-end credit is simply too different
from traditional time-price sales to be covered by the doctrine, two
52
states have recently held that open-end credit transactions are usurious.
THEORY AND FACT:
THE TIME-PRICE DOCTRINE AND THE CREDIT SALE INDUSTRY
As seen above, several arguments are advanced to justify the continuing existence of the time-price doctrine. Most notable are the
assertions that:
(a) since the buyer is free to choose between cash and time payment he cannot compain that he picked the more expensive;
(b)

the doctrine allows the seller to get what he can for his goods;

(c) the transactions governed by the doctrine are fundamentally
different from loans and should be exempted from usury laws; and
(d) the demand for consumer instalment sale credit necessitates
the continuance of the doctrine.
None of these arguments is borne out by fact.
The first argument is that the freedom of the buyer to choose between cash and time prices changes the nature of the transaction from
a loan to a sale. The argument originated when credit sales were of
luxuries which the buyer could simply choose not to purchase. Those
"See, cases annotated at 14 A.L.R.3d 1065, 1128 (1967).
'"Atlas Security Co., v. Copeland, supra note 11.
rLloyd v. Gutgsell, supra note 47.
5
'National Bank of Commerce v. Thomsen, 80 Wash.2d 406, 495 P.2d 332 (1972).
"Wisconsin: State v. J. C. Penney, 48 Wisc.2d 125, 179 N.W.2d 641 (1970);
Dakota: Bollinger v. J. C. Penney, 192 N.W.2d 699 (1972).
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who borrowed money of necessity were protected from overreaching by
usury statutes. 53 It is simply no longer true that only luxuries are sold
on credit. The argument is still advanced. One expert refers to this
'54
state of affairs as "manifestly anachronistic.
In light of the prevalence of the practice of discounting the contracts to a finance agency 55 the argument that the transaction is a sale
rather than a loan also stands out as a fiction. The seller himself extends no credit. 56 When such discounting takes place the only difference
between the time-price sale and an outright loan to the buyer is the
amount of interest the finance agency is allowed to collect.
The same facts dispose of the contention that the seller should be
able to set such prices for his goods as the market will bear. In practice
the seller merely recovers his cash price when he discounts the contract.
The finance agency benefits from the credit price.
The final argument for the retention of the time-price doctrine is
more compelling. There is a great demand for consumer sale credit; to
some extent the time-price doctrine has met the demand. When all of
the qualifications of the doctrine are considered, however, it is questionable exactly how well the doctrine has answered the call for reasonable
regulation. The person who would extend credit must be able to base
his actions on reliable law. The time-price doctrine is being limited in
state after state.5 7 It can no longer be argued that there is no alternative to the time-price doctrine. New legislation is available to regulate
consumer credit sale finance charges and at the same time avoid the
difficulties of the time-price approach. 5 Even the demand for consumer
sale credit is no longer a valid argument for retaining the doctrine.
That the status of the time-price doctrine is somewhat unstable in
the nation as a whole, however, is not a persuasive argument for changing the law in Montana. An examination of Montana's law regulating
consumer instalment sale credit shows that this state as well suffers
from the nation-wide weakness of the time-price doctrine.
FINANCE RATE REGULATION IN MONTANA
The Montana supreme court has yet to decide whether or not the

58see, material aupra note 41.
"Warren, supra note 7 at 843.
'See, the figures for automobile sales alone, supra note 5.
'See, the discussion of the relationship in National Bank of Commerce v. Thomsen,
supra note 51, when the contract was discounted with recourse.
'Arkansas: Sloan v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 228 Ark. 464, 308 S.W.2d 802; Nebraska:
Lloyd v. Gutgsell, supra note 47; South Dakota: Rollinger v. J. C. Penney, supra note
51, have all recently either abandoned or severely limited the time-price doctrine. In
addition six states have adopted the UNFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE and avoided the
problem. 1 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1291, Chart: Uniform Consumer Credit Code.
3See, the discussion or the UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE, infra.
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time-price doctrine is part of this state's law. 59 Since 1959, however, the
Montana Retail Instalment Sale Act60 has regulated consumer instalment
sales. A convincing argument may be made that by adoption of the
Act the legislature at least tacitly, if not expressly, accepted the timeprice doctrine. 61 With respect to closed end credit, however, it makes
little difference whether the act embodies the doctrine. The Act speaks
62
directly to the retail instalment sale contracts held by finance agencies
as well as to the activities of sellers 63 and thus avoids the problems some,
states have encountered with the relationships between sellers and finance agencies.6
The few cases concerned with the application of the Act have centered around the constitutionality of the Act in light of a provision of
the Montana constitution of 1889 prohibiting special laws regulating the
rate of interest on money. 65 The problem was first raised in a federal
district court case, B-W Acceptance Corporation v. Torgerson.66 Judge
Jameson considered the problem sufficiently close to invoke the doctrine
7
of judicial abstention. The issue was for the state courts to decide.1
The matter rested there until May of 1972 when a summary judgment
was handed down in Cecil v. Allied Stores.6 8 The decision holds in part
that the Act is unconstitutional as a special interest act because it
allows retail sellers under the special rates of the Act 69 to sell goods
for credit at a higher finance charge than that allowed other sellers.
In reaching this conclusion the court relied upon the decisions of the

51The court's discussion in Favero v. Wynacht, 140 Mont. 358, 371 P.2d 858, 867-870
.(1962). comes close. The result in that case, however, was the. finding that the transaction questioned was merely a secured loan.
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 74-601 et seq.
',Britton and Ulrich, supra note 23 at 139, discuss the relationship of time-price doctrine
and retail instalment sale acts in detail.
aSee, especially R.C.M. 1947, §§ 74-603, 74-604. See also, Note, Montana Legislative
Summary 1959, Retail Instalment Sales, 20 MONT. L.R. 136 (1959).
-R.C.M. 1947, §§ 74-601 et seq. generally.
"The Washington decision to restrict the application of the time-price doctrine may be
attributed in part to the Washington Retail Instalment Act, REVISED CODE Or WASHINGToN ANNOTATED §§ 63.14 et seq. (1963) which deals only with sellers and does not
speak to finance agencies. See, discussion in National Bank of Commerce v. Thomsen,
supra note 51 at 337.
"MONT. COSST. art. V, § 25 (1889):
The legislative assembly shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following
cases, that is to say: . . . regulating the rate of interest on'money; .".. * "
The corresponding provision of the Montana Constitution of 1972, which does 'not
become effective until July 1,-1973, is .found in article V, § 12 and reads: "The
legislature.shall not. pass. a special or local act when a general act is, or. can be made,
applicable." Whether this section will have a different effect than its predecessor is
uncertain.
6234 F. Supp. 214 (D. Mont. 1964).
61Id. at p. 217.
6]The text of this summary judgment may be found at 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE
89, 080, § 99, 181.
-R.C.M. 1947. § 74-608.
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Supreme Court of Nebraska 70 which came to a similar result when faced
with the interpretation of an identical constitutional provision. 71 In the
expected appeal of Cecil, the constitutionality of the Act as a whole will
be squarely before the Montana supreme court.
The same case, Cecil v. Allied Stores, 71 raises another fundamental
problem of Montana instalment sale credit law. If the Retail Instalment
Sale Act deals reasonably effectively with closed end credit, the same
cannot be said with regard to open-end credit. When the Act was
passed it not only placed limits upon finance charges7 2 but also set
certain requirements for the retail instalment sale contracts which are
73
made an incident of any valid credit sale.
A contract must disclose: the amount of time-price ;74 the amount
of the cash price ;75 the amount of each instalment ;76 and the due date
of each instalment. 77 In 1971 the Act was amended to include open-end
credit transactions.7 8 The general provisions of the Act regarding disclosure were not changed. Open-end credit was not excluded from these
requirements. The result of the amendment is that the same requirements placed on disclosure in closed-end credit transactions where total
finance charge and number and size of instalments are agreed upon in
advance apply to open-end credit sales.
This burden of disclosure is impossible for a seller to meet. The
essence of the open-end sale is the flexibility given the buyer. He may
pay all of the outstanding balance of his account before any finance
charge is due or he may extend his payments. The decision is his alone.
The seller cannot know in advance how many, if any, instalment payments will be necessary or what finance charge if any will be paid.
He can have no idea what amount the buyer will pay in any one
instalment if the buyer decides to buy over time. The seller can and
does reveal beforehand what his service charge will be for deferred
payment. He can, however, only state the charge in terms of a per,
centage of the outstanding balance. This is clearly not the disclosure
required by the Act. 79 The type of disclosure requirements originating
"In Elder v. Doerr, 175 Neb. 483, 122 N.W.2d 528 (1963) the Nebraska court was
called upon to evaluate the Nebraska Retail Instalment Sale Act in light of Article III
§ 18 of the Nebraska Constitution which reads:
The legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following cases,
that is to say:
regulating the interest on money.
The court said that the act authorized an instalment loan in the guise -of a sale and
called the act "unreasonable, arbitrary and capricious. Id. at 537.
nOecil' v. Allied Stores, supra note 68.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 74-608.
-R.C.M. 1947, § 74-607.
T
"R.C.M. 1947, § 74-607 (f) (8).
('.C.M.
1947,
74-607(f) (1).
R.C.M. 1947, § 74-607(f) (8).
771d.
7LAWS Or MONTANA, Ch. 416 (1971).
-R.C.M. 1947, § 74-611(b) forbids anyone in violation of R.C.M. 1947, § 74-607 from
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in the time-price doctrine and codified in the Retail Instalment Sale
Act simply do not apply to open-end credit. This question will also face
the Montana supreme court in the expected appeal of Cecil v. Allied
Stores.
Some of the possible answers to the questions raised by Cecil are
not pleasant. A finding that the Retail Instalment Sale Act is unconstitutional would leave the usury statute the only regulator of consumer
instalment sale finance charges. Only one state is in a similar situation
and the results there have not been satisfactory.80 If the Act is declared
constitutional the problem of open-end credit remains. It is difficult
to see how the requirements of the Act can be met in consumer open-end
credit transactions.
The dilemma facing the court is an example of the basic problem:
a case-by-case approach cannot deal effectively with the complexities
of sale credit. Neither can a piecemeal legislative attack. What is needed
is a comprehensive program of legislation based on the realities of the
modern credit industry. Only the legislature can provide such a law,
and the legislature has failed to act. A stumbling block has been the
difficulty and expense of drafting the needed laws. The drafting has
now been done, however, and legislation is available which would solve
the problems created by the time-price approach to finance charge
regulation.
THE UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT-AN ALTERNATIVE
In 1968 the Uniform Consumer Credit Code (UCCC) was released
by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved
by the American Bar Association for adoption by the states. The UCCC
is an attempt to codify the law of consumer credit transactions much
as the Uniform Commercial Code has codified the law of commercial
transactions in general.8 1 Two states 2 quickly enacted the UCCC. It
was then the subject of a battle in the law reviews83 To the surprise
of the drafters, much of the criticism of the UCCC came from consumers
and their advocates, notably the National Consumer Law Center which
drafted its own National Consumer Act to correct the flaws the Center
found in the UCCC. 4 The upshot of the controversy is the current re85
drafting of the UCCC to meet some of these criticisms.
'0See, material cited supra note 24.
"See, Prefatory Note to 1968 Revised Final Draft UCCC.
uLAWs OF OKLAHOMA (1969), H. 1001; LAWS OF UTAH (1969),
Ch. 18; LAWS OF
COLORADO (1961), Ch. 207; LAWS OF IDAHO (1971), Cr. 299; LAWS OF. INDIANA
(1971), S. 5; LAWS OF WYOMING (1971), Oh. 191.
SaSee, articles cited in Braucher, Consumer Credit Reform: Rates, Profits and Cornpe:
tition, 43 TEMP. L.Q. 313 (1970) at 313, note 1.
mPrinted in full in B. CLARK AND J. FONSECA, HANDLING CONSUME C DIT CASzs
(1972).
5All citations in this note are to the most recent result of this redrafting, to be found
..in CCH INSTALMENT CREDIT GUIDE, CONSUMER CREDIT ExTIRA EDITION, Issue no. 15,
no. 101 (Sept. 8, 1972).
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The Revised UCCC is divided into nine articles. The seventh and
eighth are empty, reserved for future use. Article Nine contains the
effective date and repealer of the act. Of the remaining six articles the
first sets the stage by providing general provisions and definitions.
Article Two of the Revised UCCC is the critical part with respect to
regulation of finance rates for consumer credit sales. Acting on the
theory that usury statutes have failed to protect consumers and have
restricted the availability of credit for those who do not need protection,
the Revised UCCC repeals usury statutes.86 The remainder of Article
Two sets maximum rates as well as methods of rate calculation for
closed-end credit sales,8 7 open-end credit sales8s and loans. One part
sets licensing regulations for lenders.9 0 The result of this section is to
eliminate the uncertainties inherent in the time-price doctrine and to
simplify the law of consumer credit transactions in general.
• Article Three of the UCCC is entitled "Regulations of Agreements
and Practices." The article contains several far-reaching changes in the
law of consumer-merchant relations. Some examples are: limitations
on the use of security in consumer credit transactions;91 prohibitions
of assignment of earnings and confessions of judgment ;92 and strict limitations on the holder in due course doctrine.9 3 Part Five of Article
94
Three attempts to eliminate some of the abuses of home solicitation sales.
Article Four of the UCCC regulates insurance.
The two remaining articles of the UCCC provide the means of implementing the other provisions. Article Five sets limits on creditors'
remedies and provides remedies for consumers.9 5 The article imposes
criminal penalties for creditors violating certain parts of the act. Article
Six establishes the office of an administrator whose function is to work
in conjunction with a council of advisors to enforce the UCCC.
The UCCC is not perfect. It is an improvement over present law.
Adoption of the UCCC would solve both the problems raised in this
state by Cecil v. Allied Stores. The law regulating finance rates would
become more simple and more rational. These are both benefits not
offered by the time-price doctrine and legislation based upon it.

86REVisED

UCCC § 2-601 (Comment).

RFEVISED UCCC § 2-201.
1R EVISED
OREvISED
wREvisED
9'REvISED

UCCC

UCCC

§ 2-202.

§§ 2-401, 402.

UCCC §§ 2-301 through 2-309.
UCCO §§ 3-301 through 3-303.

UCCC §§ 3-305, 3-306.
§§ 3-307, 3-404, 3-405.
REvisED UCCC §§ 3-501, 3-505.
"REvIsED UCCC §§ 5-501 through 5-203.
91REVISED UCCC §§ 5-301, 302.
12REVISED
03

REVIsED UCCC

https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mlr/vol34/iss1/8

12

Strong: Finance
Installment Credit
The Time-Price Doctrine
In Montana
162 Rates In ConsumerMONTANA
LAW Sales:
REVIEW
[Vol.
34
CONCLUSION
The time-price doctrine was born in another time and another
role. It was used with the advent of consumer instalment credit to
answer the question of how to provide the high rates necessary to consumer instalment credit sale, a question left unanswered by the legislatures. Since the doctrine was first applied, the field has become more
complex, and the doctrine has been twisted to meet the increasing
demands. Now the Montana supreme court faces the problem forced
upon several courts in the recent past-how to fit the doctrine and its
offshoots into the pattern of modern finance. The task is not easy.
With every modification of the doctrine a new question springs up.
Now, as when the doctrine was first applied to consumer sales, the
solution does not lie with the courts. An over-all approach to sale
finance regulation has been made. The result is the Uniform Consumer
Credit Code and legislation like it. The legislature now bears the
responsibility for making more modern and more rational the regulation
of finance rates in consumer credit sales.
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